Introduction
Consider n players, engaged in a repeated play of a finite game in strategic (normal) form. Every player assumes that each of the other players is using a stationary (i.e., time independent) mixed strategy. The players observe the actions taken in previous stages, update their beliefs about their opponents' strategies, and choose myopic pure best responses against these beliefs. In a``Fictitious Play,'' proposed by Brown [1] , every article no. 0014 player (except for Player i ) takes the empirical distribution of Player i 's actions to be his belief about Player i 's mixed strategy. 1 The definition of the fictitious play process may depend on first move rules, weights assigned to initial beliefs, and tie breaking rules determining the particular best replies chosen at each stage. In this note we stick to the original definition of fictitious play in which the first moves are chosen arbitrarily and no tie-breaking rules are assumed. Our result remains valid under the above-mentioned possible modifications of the definition.
We say that the process converges in beliefs to equilibrium if the sequence of beliefs (regarded as mixed strategies) is as close as we wish to the set of equilibria after a sufficient number of stages. 2 Equivalently, the process converges in beliefs to equilibrium if for every =>0, the beliefs are in =-equilibrium after a sufficient number of stages. We say that a game has the fictitious play property (FPP) if every fictitious play process converges in beliefs to equilibrium. Shapley [11] constructed an example of a 3_3 2-person game without the FPP. It is therefore important to identify classes of games with the FPP.
Robinson [10] proved that every 2-person zero-sum game has the FPP. Miyasawa [6] proved (using a particular tie-breaking rule) that every 2-person 2_2 game has the FPP. 3 Milgrom and Roberts [5] showed that every game which is dominance solvable has the FPP. Krishna [4] proved that if the strategy sets are linearly ordered, then every game with strategic complementarities and diminishing returns has the FPP, if a particular tiebreaking rule is used. Deschamps [3] proved that 2-person linear Cournot games have the FPP. Thorlund Petersen [12] proved that n-person linear Cournot games have the FPP. 4 In this note we show that a fictitious play process converges in beliefs to equilibrium if and only if it converges in beliefs to equilibrium in the Cesaro mean. We then show that every game in which all players have the same payoff function has the FPP. Obviously, the FPP is invariant under utility transformations that preserve the mixed best response structure of the game. Consequently, every game which is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a game with identical payoff functions must have the 259 fictitious play property FPP. Such games are called games with identical interests. We further note in this paper that every nondegenerate 2-person 2_2 game is best response equivalent in mixed strategies either to a game of the form (A, A) or to a zero-sum game (i.e., a game of the form (A, &A)). Miyasawa's theorem is thus derived by combining our theorem with Robinson's. 
:
We identify the pure strategy y i # Y i with the extreme point of 2 i which assigns a probability 1 to
be the payoff function of player i in the mixed extension of 1. That is,
For i # N and for f # 2 we denote
Let g # 2, and let =>0. g is an =-equilibrium if for each i # N,
Denote by K=K(1 ) the equilibrium (in mixed strategies) set of 1, and denote by & & any fixed Euclidean norm on 2. For $>0 set
A path in Y is a sequence y=( y(t)) t=1 of elements of Y. A belief path is a sequence f=( f (t)) t=1 in 2. We say that the belief path ( f (t)) t=1 converges to equilibrium if each limit point is an equilibrium point; that is, if for every $>0 there exists an integer T such that f (t) # B $ (K) for all t T. Obviously, the belief path converges to equilibrium if and only if for every =>0 there exists an integer T such that f (t) is an =-equilibrium for every t T. We say that the belief path ( f (t)) t=1 converges to equilibrium in the Cesaro mean if
Equivalently, it can be shown that the belief path converges to equilibrium in the Cesaro mean iff for every =>0,
where K = denotes the set of all =-equilibrium points. Obviously, convergence to equilibrium implies convergence to equilibrium in the Cesaro mean.
To each path y we associate a belief path f y :
y(t) for every t 1.
Note that
A path y=( y(t)) t=1 is a fictitious play process if for every i # N
Note that (1.3) means that y i (t+1) is a best response to f &i y (t). We say that the fictitious play process ( y(t)) t=1 converges in beliefs to equilibrium (in the Cesaro mean) if the associated belief path converges to equilibrium(in the Cesaro mean).
We say that 1 has the fictitious play property (FPP) if every fictitious play process in 1 converges in beliefs to equilibrium.
The next lemma will be used in our main theorem. It may also be useful in identifying other classes of games with the FPP.The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of the well known theorem about bounded sequences of real numbers: Convergence in the Cesaro mean of the Cesaro means implies convergence in the Cesaro mean. Lemma 1. For every game in strategic form, a fictitious play process converges in beliefs to equilibrium if and only if it converges in beliefs to equilibrium in the Cesaro mean.
Proof. Let y=( y(t)) t=1 be a fictitious play process, and let f= ( f (t)) t=1 be its associated belief process. Obviously we have to prove only the``if '' part. Let then $>0 be given. Denote
and choose '<$Â(2$+M). By (1.1) there exists an integer T 0 such that for every T T 0 ,
We claim that for every T T 0 , f (T ) # B 2$ (K). Suppose T T 0 and f (T ) Â B 2$ (K). Then it can be easily verified (because the step size at stage t is 1Ât) that f (t) Â B $ for T t T+($Â($+M)) T. Hence
Every game with identical payoff functions has the fictitious play property.
Proof. Denote the joint payoff function by u. That is, u i =u for all i # N. Recall that U denotes the multilinear extension of u. Let ( f (t)) t=0 be the belief process associated with a fictitious play process ( y(t)) t=1 . Assume without loss of generality that max f # 2 |U( f )| 2 &n . By (1.2), (1.3), and the multilinearity of U we get
By (1.6), because a t 0 for every t 1,
We prove that
which implies that
Since lim T Ä b T+1 =0, (1.9) follows. Let K = be the set of all =-equilibrium points of 1. By (1.9), for every =>0
Therefore (1.1) is satisfied, and the proof follows from Lemma 1. K
Consider fixed strategy sets
.., u n ), with the payoff functions u 1 , u 2 , ..., u n , is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to the game 1(w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n ) if for every i # N, and for every mixed strategy profile
. A game with identical interests is a game which is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a game with identical payoff functions. By Theorem A, every game with identical interests has the fictitious play property.
Remarks
(1) Deriving Miyasawa's theorem. Consider a 2-person 2_2 game described by the bimatrix (A, B)=(a(i, j), b(i, j)) 2 i, j=1 . We say that the game is nondegenerate, or that it has the diagonal property if :{0 and ;{0, where :=a(1, 1)&a(2, 1)&a(1, 2)+a(2, 2), and ;=b(1, 1)&b(2, 1)&b(1, 2)+b(2, 2).
It is easily verified that every nondegenerate 2_2 game that does not have identical interests is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a zero-sum fictitious play property game. So, either by Theorem A or by Robinson's theorem, every nondegenerate 2_2 game has the FPP.
(2) Converging to a purely mixed equilibrium. The next example shows that a fictitious play process may converge in beliefs to a purely mixed strategy profile. Consider the 2-person 2_2 pure-coordination game with (1, 1) on the diagonal, and (0, 0) elsewhere. If the initial belief of the players consists of a pair of pure strategies in which they do not coordinate, the fictitious play will converge to the unique purely mixed equilibrium of the game.
(3) Utility transformations. Deschamps [2] showed that the FPP is not necessarily invariant under increasing transformations of the utility functions that do not preserve the best response structure in mixed strategies. Monderer and Sela [8] introduced the concept of FPPS (fictitious play property in strategies). A game has the FPPS if every fictitious play process converges to a (necessarily pure strategy) equilibrium. 6 The FPPS is invariant under all increasing transformations of the utility functions. Moreover it is invariant under increasing transformations that depend on the other players' actions. That is, Player i 's utility function, u i , is transformed to v i by
where T y &i is an increasing function. The previous example shows that not every 2-person game of the form (u, u) has the FPPS. We conjecture, however, that every generic such game (and consequently every game which can be transformed to such a generic game by (2.1)) has the FPPS. Our conjecture is based on the improvement principle of [8] . According to this principle, if Player i switches to a new pure strategy y i (t+1), then u i ( y i (t+1), y &i (t))>u i ( y(t)). Therefore if the two players never switch simultaneously, then u( y(t)) never decreases and it increases whenever any player switches to a new strategy. It follows that the sequence ( y(t)) t=1 is constant after sufficiently large t. That is, it must converge. So, to prove our conjecture one can show that for a generic game of the form (u, u), simultaneous moves are impossible. We further conjecture that every 2-person game that can be transformed to a game of the form (u, u) by (2.1) has the FPP. Note, however, that the improvement principle does not hold 7 for n-person games with n 3.
